ObamaCare
Endgame: Achieve Savings by Redistributing Income from Specialists to Primary Care Physicians
MACRA (Medicare Access and CHIP
Reauthorization Act of 2015) which shifts traditional Medicare patients into
risk-based reimbursement by giving
doctors incentives to join with hospitals to form
Accountable Care Organizations to share “savings” with hospitals and to
join organizations that employ primary care organizations in order to achieve savings by reaching measurable quality goals by reducing the
specialty care referrals.
According to Robert Kocher, MD, and Anuraag Chigurapati, MS, at policy institutes at the University of California, Stanford, and Harvard, the MACRA endgame is designed to redistribute income to primary care physicians from specialists ("The Coming Battle over Shared Savings - Primary Care versus Specialists," New England Journal of Medicine, July 14, 2016,) In a sample chart in their article, the authors project MACRA could reduce incomes for diagnostic radiologists by $35,000 and cardiologists by $25,000, thereby narrowing the average incomes of $284,000 of specialists versus $195,000 for primary care physicians.
Will this MACRA scenario work in the real world?
According to Robert Kocher, MD, and Anuraag Chigurapati, MS, at policy institutes at the University of California, Stanford, and Harvard, the MACRA endgame is designed to redistribute income to primary care physicians from specialists ("The Coming Battle over Shared Savings - Primary Care versus Specialists," New England Journal of Medicine, July 14, 2016,) In a sample chart in their article, the authors project MACRA could reduce incomes for diagnostic radiologists by $35,000 and cardiologists by $25,000, thereby narrowing the average incomes of $284,000 of specialists versus $195,000 for primary care physicians.
Will this MACRA scenario work in the real world?
Specialty care is by far the most expensive cost Medicare
has to bear. In the minds of CMS officials and progressive
elistists, at least 30% of Medicare costs are unnecessary and can be
traced to physician and hospital greed, which depend on specialty referrals as
their major sources of revenue. By
curtailing specialty referrals, theoretically
one could save money by reducing hospital days,
ER visits, lengths of stay in
skilled nursing facilities, and intensity of diagnostic testing and procedures performed by specialties.
To accomplish the goals envisioned by CMS, one simply needs to measure the outcomes of Medicare
populations by measuring “population health”, by shifting risks to primary care
physicians, and by preaching the gospels
of evidence-based medicine and “value” health , both of which are loosely defined
as outcomes and quality control per doctors expended.
The basic belief system here rests on a fundamental thesis
of management, “In God we trust, all
others use data.” If you impose enough regulations and impose enough documentation rules, somehow, somewhere, somehow, government “savings” will be achieved. Unfortunately,
Government bureaucracies have no history
of achieving savings, and trust in government has reached an all time low.
ACRA requires a leap of faith in government experts to do
the job of reform, on the ability o0f government experts to analyze complex
systems, on sophisticated technocratic
analysis, and government rule-writing on the most equitable solution to social inequities.
I am profoundly skeptical about MACRA. It’s hard to understand, rests on non-commonsensical assumptions, and its bloated bureaucratic rules will raise costs. Pitting primary care doctors against specialists will be psychological offensive t many doctors, and it won’t raise quality since many consumers regard specialty essential in many instances.
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